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Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the under-
standing of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptuali-
zation, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing
against the incumbent. This conceptualization leads to the first measure of ACC that has variation between more
and less democratic political systems and variation within autocracies. We subject our measure to a rigorous set of
tests that includes addressing selection effects and temporal treatment effects, neither of which have been fully
examined in this research area. The empirical analysis offers strong support for the validity of our measure.
Which domestic political institutions affect the proba-
bility that a domestic audience will sanction its leader
for unpopular international actions? Fearon (1994)
formalized Waltz’s (1959) second image link between
the domestic restraints a leader faces and his interna-
tional behavior, arguing that in some states a leader is
an agent of the people: He does their bidding at the
international level. Because leaders are subject to a
principal, they may face or experience sanctions for
unpopular international actions, such as backing
down from public threats. Fearon labels these sanc-
tions audience costs. In turn, leaders subject to audi-
ence costs are better able to send costly signals to
clarify their resolve. Drawing on this logic, Schultz
(1999) contends that other states will be less likely to
respond to military threats issued by leaders subject to
high audience costs than to threats issued by leaders
who do not face such costs. Despite the important
role audience costs are thought to play in interna-
tional interactions, it is not clear which leaders, or
which sorts of political systems, are likely to be subject
to audience costs.
A state’s audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function
of principal–agent interactions. The central debate in
the literature is about the domestic political institu-
tions that facilitate or hinder the principal’s ability to
control the agent through domestic punishment for
behavior contrary to the principal’s preferences. Exist-
ing arguments contend (i) that democratic political
systems can generate audience costs but nondemocra-
cies cannot (Schultz 1998, 1999); (ii) that certain
regime types (democratic regimes, single-party
regimes, military regimes, dynastic monarchies, and
some well-established autocracies) can generate audi-
ence costs (Weeks 2008); (iii) that audience costs are
a function of executive constraints (Partell and Palmer
1999); or (iv) that audience costs are a function of
‘‘the stability of domestic political structures’’ (Prins
2003:68). We contend that each of these arguments
only contains part of the story. The first view does not
allow for any nondemocracy to be able to generate
audience costs, contrary to Fearon’s (1994) original
article. The regime type argument does not specify
precise institutions or allow for variation in ACC
within regimes that can generate audience costs. The
executive constraints story is one of ex-ante restraints,
but audience costs are about ex post punishment. That
is, it is not the formal laws of a state that constrain the
actions of a leader, but the institutions that allow for
the leader to be punished if her actions are deemed
unsuitable by her audience. Finally, the structural sta-
bility argument does not explain how stability trumps
repression in autocratic regimes or allow for variation
in ACC between the most authoritarian and most
democratic regimes. Building on these approaches,
1 Author’s note: We would like to thank James Morrow, Brandon Prins,
Christopher Reenock, Allan Stam, and Jana von Stein for valuable feedback at
various stages of this project. We presented previous versions of this paper at
the Peace Science (International) Association, Binghamton University, and
the Midwest Political Science Association. Replication material for all tables in
the paper and the online appendix are available at http://mailer.fsu.edu/
~msouva/research.htm.
Uzonyi, Gary, Mark Souva, and Sona N. Golder. (2012) Domestic Institutions and Credible Signals. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00746.x
 2012 International Studies Association
International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 765–776
particularly Weeks (2008), we present a more general
and developed conceptualization of the domestic polit-
ical institutions governing ACC, a conceptualization
that accounts for how ACC varies within and across
regime types.
Rather than focusing on the leader’s ability to
‘‘monitor and punish’’ potential challengers (Weeks
2008:39, 41), we contend that it is more useful to
focus on how institutions affect the specific costs the
principal bears for challenging the incumbent.
Specifically, institutions affect the exit cost that chal-
lengers face as well as the transaction, opportunity,
and possible sanctioning costs for supporters of a chal-
lenger. This conceptual shift to the principal’s cost
terms leads us to create a new measure of ACC that is
not based on regime types but on institutions that vary
within and across regime types. Our measure of ACC
is the first that has (i) variation between more and less
democratic political systems and (ii) variation within
nondemocratic political systems. It also covers a much
larger temporal and cross-sectional domain compared
with recent efforts to measure autocratic audience
costs.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our measure of
ACC, we use it to test standard models of interstate
conflict. Specifically, we test whether increases in a
leader’s ACC increase the likelihood of other states
backing down from military threats. We find robust
support for this hypothesis across a wide variety of
model specifications and time periods, including the
pre–Cold War era. We also address concerns about
selection effects and still find strong support for the
audience cost hypothesis using our measure of ACC.
When this strong empirical support for our measure
is coupled with the conceptual clarity we offer on
which domestic institutions generate audience costs,
we believe our measure of ACC offers significant
improvements over existing measures of ACC.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review the
key elements of the audience cost argument and
extant measures of ACC. We then offer our account of
how domestic institutions affect the audience costs
faced by leaders. Building on this account, we describe
a new measure of ACC that allows us to capture the
types of domestic institutions that affect the ability and
willingness of the principal to impose such a cost on
its agent. After describing the research design, we pres-
ent empirical analyses along with a wide variety of
robustness checks and sensitivity analyses.
Background: Audience Costs and International Conflict
The idea of ‘‘cheap talk’’ extends far back in the
annals of political science. Scholars have long noted
that leaders have an incentive to misrepresent their
actions, capabilities, desires, and willingness in
attempts to better their position at the international
bargaining table. Schelling (1960, 1966) posited that
in order to overcome this perverse incentive, a leader
must find a way to credibly signal his intentions.
According to Schelling, this could be done by tying
the leader’s reputation to both domestic and interna-
tional sources. Sources of domestic credibility come
from a domestic audience’s ability to remove a leader
who backed down on what he promised his people. If
a leader made an international promise, and later
backed down from it, he would lose international cred-
ibility and the ability to make subsequent believable
promises.
Fearon (1994) formalized the link between the
domestic constraints a leader faces and her interna-
tional behavior. Fearon argued that in some states, a
leader is an agent of the people and does their bid-
ding at the international level. Backing down from a
public threat calls a leader’s competence into ques-
tion. In backing down, a leader risks domestic punish-
ment for demonstrating poor leadership and a lack of
resolve by making statements that should probably not
have been made in the first place. Fearon (1994:577)
called the costs a leader faces for poor leadership
‘‘audience costs.’’ What is significant about ACC is
that it enables a leader to send costly signals to clarify
her resolve and thereby resolve crises diplomatically,
short of all-out war. Leaders who face large audience
costs for reneging on threats or promises are not likely
to issue hollow threats. Audience costs, then, can be
seen as a type of tying-hands signal (Fearon 1997) that
ameliorates the information and commitment prob-
lems contributing to the outbreak of war (Fearon
1995).
In Fearon’s (1994) original war-of-attrition signaling
model, audience costs are only generated if a domestic
audience can hold its agent (the leader) accountable
for her actions, the leader makes a public threat from
which she backs down, and the audience views the lea-
der’s decision to back down from a threat as worse
than conceding without having made a threat. If, as
Fearon suggests, various regime types are able to pro-
duce audience costs, the question becomes what insti-
tutions strengthen a principal’s control over its agent
and allow the principal to punish the leader?
There are four existing arguments, and accompany-
ing measures, about which domestic political institu-
tions facilitate the generation of audience costs. First,
Schultz (1998) argues that opposition political parties
are central to audience costs. Opposition parties can
gain electorally from challenging a leader’s decision to
engage the state in conflict when the leader’s choice
produces unsuccessful foreign policy. If the opposition
believes that such gains are possible from opposing a
conflict, it will challenge the leader’s decision to esca-
late a dispute. Since dissent can be costly to the opposi-
tion party, the opposition will only challenge the leader
when it believes the proposed course of action is not
likely to succeed. Therefore, a leader who faces an
opposition party is unlikely to engage in international
disputes unless highly resolved. Not all leaders have to
contend with opposition political parties, and when this
is the case, leaders cannot generate meaningful audi-
ence costs. Based on this argument, Schultz (1999) mea-
sures audience-cost-generating institutions as a
dichotomous variable equivalent to whether a state is
democratic or not. If a state has a score of seven or
greater on the Polity democracy–autocracy index, then
a state can generate audience costs; states scoring below
this value cannot generate audience costs. Schultz’s op-
erationalization of the audience cost concept is consis-
tent with Fearon’s (1994) argument that democratic
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states can either generate greater degrees of audience
costs or generate them more quickly than autocracies,
but his empirical approach does not allow for variation
in the ability of autocracies to generate audience costs,
which is not consistent with Fearon (1994).
Second, Partell and Palmer (1999) argue that con-
straints on the executive are the basic characteristic of
audience costs. They argue that as a leader’s policy
autonomy decreases, the more she is reliant on others,
and thus it is easier to remove her should she fail to
perform her duties to a satisfactory level. Partell and
Palmer (1999), then, measure audience-cost-generat-
ing institutions as constraints on the chief executive.
This measure has the virtue of allowing at least some
autocracies to create audience costs while allowing
most democratic regimes to generate more audience
costs. However, the audience cost story is one of ex post
punishments rather than ex-ante restraint. Laws that
forbid action are not necessary for the production or
measure of audience costs, since these laws are useless
if institutions are not in place that allow for the pun-
ishment of undesired actions. Indeed, Partell and Pal-
mer do not explain how executive constraints lead to
sanctions on the executive should a policy failure
occur.
Third, Prins (2003) contends that unregulated and
factional political participation creates uncertainty
about the leadership’s preferences and resolve. In
turn, target states are less likely to back down from
threats issued by states with ‘‘non-institutionalized
(that is, factional) political participation’’ (Prins
2003:72). This approach has much to recommend it.
Political participation, in some sense, as we elaborate
below, is a necessary condition for audience costs.
While this approach allows some nondemocratic
regimes to generate audience costs, it suggests that the
ACC of a fully democratic state is the same as an auto-
cratic state. That is, the measure used by Prins does
not capture variation in ACC across regimes. Insofar as
the regulation of political participation is what is key,
this measure errs in equating the ACC of strong auto-
cratic states with institutionalized and developed dem-
ocratic states. Finally, this approach does not provide
an explanation of why factional participation should
be viewed the same as unregulated participation. Nev-
ertheless, we think that Prins’ argument about the
importance of political participation highlights a key
element of ACC, an element that subsequent measures
of autocratic audience costs have neglected.
Fourth, Weeks (2008) argues that audience costs
depend on (i) the ability and desire of the opposition
to coordinate to punish a leader; (ii) viewing backing
down as worse than following through; and (iii) outsid-
ers having the ability to observe the possibility of sanc-
tions. Instead of examining different domestic
institutions, Weeks looks at regime types to determine
whether a particular leader is likely to be able to gener-
ate audience costs. Some specific regimes can generate
audience costs, and some regimes cannot. In ‘‘prac-
tice’’, Weeks’ measure boils down to whether a leader
controls appointments to the security organs or the
security organs themselves because if the leader can
monitor and punish opponents, then coordination by
the opposition to punish the leaders is not possible
(Weeks 2008:39, 41). ‘‘More specifically, elites will have
greater incentives to coordinate if the leader cannot
monitor and punish defection through personal con-
trol of intelligence and security organs and does not
control political appointments’’ (Weeks 2008:44). We
agree that a leader’s ability to monitor and punish
potential defectors affects the coordination costs of
challenging an incumbent and that coordination influ-
ences the generation of audience costs. However, this
conceptualization does not identify the full set of costs
the principal faces if it wants to punish the agent. Chal-
lengers have to consider the exit costs associated with a
failed challenge. Further, as we describe in more detail
below, it is more precise to say that coordination costs
are a function of transaction and opportunity costs.
Finally, the conceptual focus on monitoring and pun-
ishing leads Weeks to create a dichotomous measure of
audience costs. Such a measure implies that democratic
regimes have no greater ability to generate audience
costs than most autocracies, though original discussions
of the concept indicate the contrary (Fearon
1994:578).2 In the next section, we present a more gen-
eral conceptualization of state audience cost capacity.
In the next section, we build on Weeks (2008) and
offer a more general conceptualization of ACC.
A More General Conceptualization of Audience Cost
Capacity
Fearon (1997:69) defines audience costs as the costs
‘‘that would be suffered if the leader backed down or
backed away from a public threat or warning issued in
a crisis.’’ According to Fearon (1994), levels of audi-
ence costs sufficient to bind a leader to her threats
can only be generated in those polities in which the
leader acts as the agent of some domestic audience
(the principal). In such states, the principal is able to
control the leader’s actions through a type of ‘‘wage
contract,’’ by punishing the leader for escalating a cri-
sis and then backing down. The likelihood that a lea-
der is held accountable by the audience varies
according to the institutional arrangements of the
state (McGillivray and Smith 2000).
Audience costs are best understood from a princi-
pal–agent perspective. In the context of international
relations, the domestic audience is the principal and
the leader is the agent. The leader is supposed to rep-
resent the interests of the audience on the interna-
tional stage. However, delegation introduces the
problem of moral hazard, in that it gives the leader
the opportunity to take actions that her audience
would not want her to take. Moral hazard increases as
the agent becomes more insulated from risk. Domestic
audiences desire foreign policies under which the state
prospers (Smith 1998). In the international context,
then, risk can be understood as the probability of
engaging in an action likely to have negative conse-
quences for state prosperity (Bueno de Mesquita,
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). If a leader is
2 It is also not clear that one can extract the necessary information about
control of the security organs from Geddes’s (2003) data. Geddes bases her
classifications on a composite score and, in her book, does not provide the
data on answers to specific questions.
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unlikely to lose office for failure to conduct a good
foreign policy, the leader has little incentive to abide
strictly by the desires of her audience and moral haz-
ard increases.
Audience costs are the mechanism through which
the audience attempts to limit moral hazard (Fearon
1994). If the leader is subject to punishment for bad
foreign policy, she is tied more closely to the risk asso-
ciated with her policies and is less likely to engage in
foreign policies that do not benefit her audience.
Thus, to reduce moral hazard, the audience must be
able to punish the leader, exposing her to the cost
associated with a poor foreign policy.
How is an audience able to make the leader sensi-
tive to these costs? We argue that audience costs are
primarily a function of institutions affecting the con-
testability for the head of state position. As contestabil-
ity increases, a leader faces greater risk (that is, a
greater probability of suffering a cost for a poor policy
choice), and therefore, audience costs for the leader
increase. We build on Lake and Baum (2001:593),
who argue that contestability is a function of two types
of costs: exit and mobilizing costs.3
First, potential challengers are more plentiful as
‘‘barriers to exit’’ or the cost of losing decreases. This
is because the ‘‘incentives for politicians to enter the
political market depend crucially on their subsequent
barriers to exit’’ (Lake and Baum 2001:594). Barriers
to exit, or challenger costs, are primarily a function of
sanctioning costs associated with a failed challenge. In
countries with low barriers to exit, challengers who
lose can often remain in politics (in an opposition
party) and can possibly compete in the next election.
The worst-case scenario is leaving politics altogether,
quite possibly to (re)turn to an occupation with higher
remuneration. However, there is a significant variation
in the sanctioning cost of failed challenges across
countries. In countries with high barriers to exit,
incumbents who lose office are ‘‘excluded from power
and often exiled or murdered’’ (Lake and Baum
2001:594). In countries with high barriers to exit, the
cost of violating the norms is high and contestation is
very limited, and as a result, fewer potential challeng-
ers enter the political market. In contrast, when the
cost of challenging is low, then more individuals have
an incentive to highlight how the agent’s actions do
not accord with their (the principal’s) preferences.
Thus, as the pool of potential challengers increases,
leaders are more mindful of the principal’s prefer-
ences in order not to run afoul of them and risk a
challenge (Tullock 1987:12). Lake and Baum treat
democracies as an example of countries with low barri-
ers to exit and autocracies as an example of countries
with high barriers to exit. While we agree that barriers
to exit would tend to be lower in countries where free
and fair elections are routine (typical of democracies),
compared to countries whose leaders are sometimes
ousted by violent coups (which is more likely to occur
in an authoritarian country), we also expect to see the
variation over the costs of exit within both democra-
cies and dictatorships.4 What distinguishes countries is
challenger exit costs, as well as transaction costs associ-
ated with mobilizing supporters, which we discuss
next. All else equal, the costs of challenging are signifi-
cantly lower in a system that allows anyone in the prin-
cipal to become the next head of state.
Second, institutional arrangements that affect the
cost of mobilizing against the agent significantly influ-
ence the regime’s ACC. When mobilizing is costly,
individuals are much less likely to act collectively.
Mobilizing against the agent involves both transaction
costs and, potentially, sanctions. The decision to pro-
test or rally against the incumbent depends on how
difficult it is to voice disapproval of the incumbent
and on what an individual thinks will happen to him
should he mobilize. In a political system in which free-
dom of assembly is not permitted, it is much more dif-
ficult to voice disapproval and one is more likely to
think others will not join in rallying against an incum-
bent (Kuran 1991). In contrast, as freedom of assem-
bly increases, it is easier to form standing political
parties, which decrease the transaction costs of mobili-
zation (Lake and Baum 2001). Further, as freedom of
assembly increases, sanctioning costs decrease, at least
to the extent that more individuals take part in the
action, for it is much more difficult to punish a large
number of opponents than a small number. Thus, as
freedom of assembly increases, more individuals are
likely to mobilize as their individual cost for acting
decreases, and as more individuals mobilize, successful
punishment of the agent is more likely to occur. These
reasons are perhaps clearer when viewed from the
opposite angle. When institutions significantly restrict
assembly, transaction and opportunity costs associated
with mobilizing increase. Without freedom of assem-
bly, it is more difficult to get out one’s message, more
difficult to coordinate with others as you likely have to
act in secret, and easier for the regime to punish you.
To summarize, audience costs are a function of the
cost of exit for any individual challenger and the cost of
mobilizing against the agent. If the cost of exit is suffi-
ciently small and a leader has proven to be incompetent
by backing down from a public threat, then someone
within the principal is likely to challenge the incum-
bent. Whether that challenge is successful or not
depends on that challenger’s ability to mobilize others
to his side. When the transaction and sanctioning costs
connected to mobilizing are high, challenges are less
3 Contestation, generally, is a central feature of many theories of democ-
racy, though the term rarely captures identical concepts (Schumpeter 1942;
Dahl 1971; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). We find Lake
and Baum’s 2001 conceptualization useful for thinking about audience cost.
4 Recent literature on institutions in authoritarian regimes shows how the
concentration of power in dictatorships varies (see Gandhi and Lust-Okar
2009 for a review). Svolik (2009), for example, models power-sharing in
authoritarian regimes to explain why power can be either narrowly concen-
trated around a single individual or shared among several groups in
authoritarian regimes. Similarly, Przeworski et al. (2000:31) say that ‘‘some
dictatorships are ‘mobilizing,’ whereas others are ‘exclusionary’.’’ Bunce and
Wolchik (2010) examine competitive authoritarian regimes, where some com-
petition for political office is tolerated, and find that even within this type of
dictatorship, there is a variation in how much contestation is allowed. Leaders
in polities that can be considered more open ‘‘in terms of the rules of the
political game to electoral challenges’’ are expected to be more vulnerable,
‘‘because they provide a more level playing field for political competition’’
(Bunce and Wolchik 2010:48). This burgeoning literature highlights the
extraordinary amount of institutional variability, in terms of the availability of
alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing against incumbents, within coun-
tries typically classified as dictatorships.
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likely to succeed. As transaction and sanctioning costs
decrease, a challenger is better able to rally a sufficient
number of individuals within the principal to punish
the agent. Audience costs, then, depend on institutions
that lower the cost of challenging an incumbent and
lower the cost of mobilizing behind a challenger. If
either of these costs is sufficiently high, then contestabil-
ity for the head of state position will be negligible and a
leader will not be able to generate audience costs. We
call this the contestability theory of ACC.
Operationalizing Audience Cost Capacity
As we just discussed, we argue that ACC is a function
of the domestic political institutions that structure the
relationship between the principal and the agent. To
operationalize ACC, we propose a composite measure
based on the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers
2008). This measure is designed to match the underly-
ing concept of audience costs more closely than the
existing measures do. It explicitly states which institu-
tions are necessary for the production of audience
costs, it is not confined to democratic states, it does
not rely on ex-ante executive constraints, and it allows
for variation across all regime types, both democratic
and autocratic.
We have argued that two sets of institutions influence
the generation of audience costs: institutions affecting
the availability of alternative rulers and those affecting
the cost of mobilizing against an incumbent. When the
institutions governing accession to the head of state
position are not open to any member of the principal
becoming the next head of state, then it is nearly
impossible that a challenger will emerge. When the
costs of political mobilization are extremely high, then
individuals within the principal are not likely to risk
being identified as opponents of the regime and rally
behind a challenger. That is, ACC is a function of two
necessary conditions: the emergence of challengers and
the ability of challengers to mobilize supporters. In
addition, we contend that a regime’s ACC varies with
the cost of political mobilization. In other words,
assuming alternative rulers exist and the cost of politi-
cal mobilization is below some threshold, then as the
cost of political mobilization declines, the probability of
punishment increases, meaning the concept of ACC is
continuous in the cost of political mobilization. 5
Based on these arguments, we use two indicators
from the Polity data to create the variable ACC. An
ideal measure of ruler availability would tell us the
average expected cost an individual will incur if he
challenges the incumbent. Lake and Baum (2001)
note that cost here is a function of the individual’s
opportunity cost associated with pursuing a challenge
and potential sanctioning costs associated with a chal-
lenge. We do not have good data on either of these
factors. However, each of them should be correlated
with the openness of the regime to a new leader
emerging from the principal. If individuals within the
principal cannot compete to become the next leader,
then anyone challenging the leader is also challenging
the system, the entire regime. The cost of challenging
is much higher as a result. To gauge the probability of
alternative rulers emerging from the principal to chal-
lenge the agent, we use the Polity indicator on open-
ness of executive recruitment (xropen). Executive
recruitment is open ‘‘to the extent that all the politi-
cally active population has an opportunity, in princi-
ple, to attain the position through a regularized
process’’ (Marshall and Jaggers 2008:20). Executive
recruitment does not require elections; it only requires
that some group choose the executive and that they
choose from all members of the political elite. Thus,
when advancement to the chief executive position is
open to the principal, the cost of challenging the lea-
der dramatically decreases. The executive recruitment
process is not open if advancement to the head of
state position occurs chiefly through heredity. Under
such a system, there is no meaningful openness or
competition to become the next head of state; as a
result, there is little incentive for the ruling group to
engage in activity against the head of state. Alterna-
tively, one may think of a system with closed executive
recruitment as not having an effective principal, and
of course if there is not an effective principal, then
there is no established group that can impose audi-
ence costs. In brief, openness of executive recruitment
is an indirect measure of the availability of alternative
rulers. Although indirect, we contend that it captures
meaningful variation, even within autocracies, in the
cost of challenging to become the next head of state.
Ideally, to measure the cost of political mobilization,
we would want a measure of the principal’s transactions
costs and any focal institutions or individuals around
which challengers may rally. These data also do not
exist. We proxy the cost of political mobilization by
using the Polity indicator on restrictions on political
participation (parcomp in the Polity data). This indica-
tor ‘‘measures the degree to which this political partici-
pation is free from government control’’ (Marshall and
Jaggers 2008:68). As restrictions on political participa-
tion increase, it becomes more costly to rally against
the incumbent. For example, a political participation
score of one indicates that the state severely represses
political mobilization, that is, ‘‘the regime bans the
organization of all rival political parties and opposi-
tional social movements’’ (Marshall and Jaggers
2008:69). Under such conditions, the costs of trying to
organize against the leader are great; as a result, it is
unlikely that a leader can generate audience costs.
More generally, as more people are allowed to
5 An alternative indicator of accountability is Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003) measure of winning coalition size. Like the contestability theory we
focus on, selectorate theory underscores the importance of public goods provi-
sion and leader selection. To test their theory, Bueno de Mesquita et al. create
a measure using three of the Polity components (xrcomp, xropen, and par-
comp) and include an indicator of whether the regime type of the state is mil-
itary or military-civilian (see Morrow, Bueno De Mesquita, Siverson, and Smith
2008:395 for a complete description). From our perspective, the primary limi-
tation of this measure is that it is based, in part, on a state’s regime type.
While ‘‘regime type’’ may be a label for states possessing a certain set of insti-
tutions, it is not clear exactly what institutions these are. Intuitively, we may
know what makes a military junta different from a single-party regime, but the
regime type label obscures precisely how these regimes differ from one
another. More concerning is the fact that not all military juntas are the same.
Using the component ‘‘military junta’’ eliminates the ability to observe the
variation among same-type regimes. Our measure of ACC is based purely on
institutions. We are explicit about how these institutions work, and which
states possess which institutions. This approach also allows for the possibility
of variation in institutions among states with the same regime type.
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assemble, it becomes less costly to organize and coordi-
nate against the head of state. Freedom to assemble
reduces the costs of opposing the leader because it
takes away legal sanctions against organizing. Although
this is a measure of the restrictions on political partici-
pation for all individuals in society, as opposed to focus-
ing exclusively on costs that the principal faces, and it
does not identify specific focal individuals on which the
opposition is likely to coordinate, coordination is much
more difficult when participation is not free.
Our measure of ACC can take on four values, rang-
ing from 0 (no ACC) to 3 (high ACC). Specifically,
the variable ACC equals zero when the Polity variable
xropen is less than or equal to two or the Polity vari-
able parcomp is equal to one. These cutoffs capture
the necessary conditions discussed above. An xropen
score of zero or one indicates that the leader is chosen
by heredity, or that if there is a chief minister, this
person is not selected through elections. When xropen
is greater than two, anyone in the politically active
population can become the leader. As noted above, a
parcomp score of one means freedom of assembly is
extremely limited. The variable ACC equals one, repre-
senting a situation of low audience costs, if xropen is
greater than two and parcomp equals two or three. A
parcomp score of two indicates that there is some but
very limited ability to politically participate. With a
score of two, at least 20% of the adult population is
denied the right of political participation. A score of
three indicates that <20% of the adult population is
denied the right of participation (Marshall and Jaggers
2008:75), but participation is highly factionalized. ACC
equals two, a medium level of ACC, if xropen is
greater than two and parcomp equals four. A parcomp
score of four indicates that political participation is
open to almost all people in society but the govern-
ment sometimes interferes in elections, typically
through police brutality or some limits on political
speech and assembly (Marshall and Jaggers 2008:78,
80). A high level of ACC, where ACC equals three,
occurs if xropen is greater than two and parcomp
equals five. A parcomp score of five means that ‘‘No
major social group or groups are routinely excluded
from the political process’’ (Marshall and Jaggers
2008:82).6 Finally, states that are experiencing a
regime transition, foreign interruption, or anarchy are
coded as not having any ACC.7 Table 1 illustrates how
parcomp and xropen are used to create the composite
ACC measure.
The value-added of our measure is threefold. First,
we provide a more nuanced theoretical justification.
From a conceptual standpoint, existing measures fall
short by (i) not identifying specific institutions that
allow for variation both between democracies and
autocracies and within autocracies and (ii) not specify-
ing the two critical institutional features—exit costs
and mobilization costs—that are jointly necessary for
the principal to sanction the agent. Arguments by
Schultz, Prins, and Weeks fail to satisfy both points A
and B. On first glance, the Partell and Palmer (1999)
idea meets both criteria. However, they do not root
their argument in principal–agent terms, making it
unclear what costs and barriers the principal must
overcome to sanction the agent.
Second, our measurement proxies, while imperfect,
more closely match the concepts in our theory. Schultz
argues that political parties are necessary, but boils this
argument down to an indicator variable for democracy
based on the Polity democracy–autocracy index. While
this index surely correlates with political parties, it is
largely driven by executive constraints (Gleditsch and
Ward 1997). Further, some autocracies have political
parties, but it is unclear from Schultz’s argument if
these regimes can generate audience costs. Is it parties
or just parties in democracies? Weeks’ (2008) measure
focuses on non-executive control of the security appa-
ratus, but the regime proxies she employs do not
directly measure this feature. To be clear, Geddes’
(2003) coding scheme involves a question about con-
trol of the security apparatus, but determination of
the regime coding is based on a composite score
rather than the answer to this or any other single ques-
tion. The indirectness of Weeks’ measure is also seen
in the coding of interregna regimes as not capable of
generating audience costs. Although this is a reason-
able argument, there is no particular reason why it
takes three (and not two or four or five) years for a
leader to consolidate control. Prins contends that
unregulated participation is the key, but his measure
treats factional participation the same as unregulated.
For Partell and Palmer (1999), the main feature is
whether the executive can implement policies on her
own. The weakness with their measure is that no argu-
ment is given for why executive autonomy increases
linearly in constraints.
Third, in practice, the most common measure of
autocratic audience costs is the one offered by Weeks.
Our measure covers a much larger empirical domain.
Given that our measure always performs as well or bet-
ter than Weeks’, the much larger empirical coverage
that we offer should be appealing to scholars working
in this area.
Description of the Data
Table 2 shows the frequency of state-years across the
range of ACC as well as the distribution of ACC for dem-
ocratic and nondemocratic regime types. For this analy-
sis, we created a state-year data set that spans the period
1816–2000 and coded a state as democratic if it scores
six or higher on the Polity democracy–autocracy index
(that is, Polity’s ‘‘polity2’’ variable). We expect that
almost all democratic states will be able to generate
audience costs, that there will be variation in ACC across
democracies, and that some nondemocratic regimes will
also have ACC. The information presented in Table 2
supports these general expectations. Approximately
95% of all democracies score a one or higher on our
ACC measure. However, only 59% of democracies earn
the maximum ACC score of three. Examples of
6 We use the 2004 version of the Polity data made for the Eugene pro-
gram (Bennett and Stam 2000). Using the Eugene version of the data ensures
that we match country codes.
7 We also created a measure of ACC in which the Polity codes of )88
(regime transition), )77 (foreign interruption), and )66 (anarchy) are coded
as missing. None of our model results are negatively affected. These results,
along with all other robustness checks mentioned below, are available in the
online appendix.
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democracies that score one or two on our ACC measure
include the United States in the first half of the nine-
teenth century and Great Britain for most of the nine-
teenth century. The reason the United States and Great
Britain do not have maximum ACC in those periods is
that political participation was limited. Weingast’s
(1997) argument about the political foundations of
democracy underscores the validity of these codings. He
notes that in highly fractionalized polities, as in the Uni-
ted States around the time of its Civil War, citizens will
have difficulty coordinating and holding the principal
accountable. Although he does not focus on coordina-
tion problems, as Weingast does and we do, Prins
(2003) also contends that accountability decreases in
fractionalized polities. Perhaps even more interesting
than democracies with an ACC score of one or two are
those with a score of zero. France in the late nineteenth
century is an example of a regime with a high score on
the Polity democracy–autocracy index (they score a 7,
making them a democracy using the standard cut points
for this index) but an ACC score of zero. France scores
a zero at that time because they did not have any free-
dom of assembly.
Table 2 not only shows that most democracies have
some ACC and that there is variation in ACC across
democracies, but also shows that democratic political
regimes are much more likely to have an ACC score
above zero than nondemocratic political regimes.
About 70% of autocracies have no ACC. This helps
explain why Schultz (1999) finds empirical support for
democracy as a measure of ACC. Relative to nonde-
mocracies, democracies are more likely to be able to
generate audience costs. Chile under Pinochet is rep-
resentative of this type of regime, an autocracy unable
to generate audience costs, despite the stability of its
political regime under Pinochet. Japan, from the
beginning of the Meiji restoration through World War
II, also scores zero on our measure of ACC. Yet, as Par-
tell and Palmer (1999), Prins (2003), and Weeks
(2008) point out, some autocracies can generate audi-
ence costs. South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s is an
example of a nondemocracy that scores a one on our
measure of ACC. Russia in the 1990s scores a two on
ACC. And, the most noteworthy example of a three on
ACC for a nondemocracy is France from about 1958–
1964. This coincides with the founding of the Fifth
Republic by Charles de Gaulle.
Finally, Weeks (2008) has become the most promi-
nent analysis of autocratic audience costs. Weeks not
only contends that some types of autocracies are able
to generate audience costs but that they can do so to
the same degree as democracies. We contend that
some autocracies are able to generate audience costs,
but that autocracies are not likely to score as high as
well-developed democracies on the institutional factors
that allow for ACC. Indeed, only one autocracy in
Weeks’ data scores a three on ACC, France in 1963
and 1964. We expect that the types of autocracies she
identifies as able to generate audience costs will tend
to have scores above zero on our measure of ACC. We
also expect that the regime types Weeks identifies as
not able to generate audience costs will generally have
scores of zero.
Weeks (2008) posits that the following regime types
can generate audience costs: democracy, single-party,
dynastic monarchy, military, and mixed nondemocra-
cies. She argues that personalist, non-dynastic monar-
chies, new democracies, and interregnum regimes
cannot generate sufficient audience costs to deter mili-
tary responses. We find that 76% of personalist states
score a zero on our measure of ACC and the addi-
tional 24% have a score of one. Similarly, 60% of
interregnum regimes register a zero on our measure
with another 36% scoring a one. Nearly, all non-dynas-
tic monarchies score a zero on our measure of ACC.
In sum, the types of regimes that Weeks identifies as
not able to generate audience costs are disproportion-
ately likely to score a zero or one on our measure of
ACC.
To be sure, one could quibble with a specific coding
about whether a state is democratic or not or some
other specific regime type, but in each of the cases just
mentioned, the Polity project provides more objective
evidence about the extent of political participation
and openness of executive recruitment. The ultimate
test of the validity of the measure will be how it per-
forms in an appropriate theoretical model. Table 2
presents the distribution of the ACC measure along
with the distributions of Partell and Palmer (1999),
Prins (2003), and Weeks (2008).8
Empirical Evaluation of ACC Measure
We evaluate our measure of ACC using standard empiri-
cal models from this literature. Fearon’s (1994) initial
war-of-attrition model was one of asymmetric informa-
tion: States know their own costs, but cannot observe the
costs faced by other states. This is a signaling game in
which each state infers the possibility that the opposi-
TABLE 1. Constructing the Audience Cost Capacity Measure
Values on XROPEN
Values on PARCOMP
0–1 2–3 4 5
Xropen £ 2 ACC = 0 ACC = 0 ACC = 0 ACC = 0
Xropen > 2 ACC = 0 ACC = 1 ACC = 2 ACC = 3
(Note. PARCOMP and XROPEN are both measures from the Polity IV data set.)
8 The correlation between our ACC measure and the xconst measure used
by Partell and Palmer (1999) is 0.83. The correlation between ACC and the
measure used by Prins (2003) is 0.08, while the correlation between ACC and
that used by Weeks (2008) is 0.40. ACC does correlate significantly with the
executive constraints measure provided by Partell and Palmer, though we
believe that our measure has stronger theoretical justification and is not an ex-
ante constraint.
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tion’s leader faces sanctions given his actions. Thus, the
value of audience costs is that they are a credible signal
of a state’s resolve. As Schultz (1999) notes, it is difficult
to test audience costs directly due to the incentive a lea-
der has to avoid behaviors in which he would suffer such
costs. Therefore, any test of institutions that lead to audi-
ence cost production must be an indirect test. Rather
than test the actual level of audience costs produced, we
must examine those situations in which a leader would
avoid having to back down from his threat. Past studies
have provided this test by examining the rate at which
other states reciprocate a militarized challenge (Schultz
1998; Prins 2003; Weeks 2008). The idea expressed
through such a test is that states that are better able to
communicate their level of resolve should face lower
rates of resistance. Stated in terms of our composite
ACC measure, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 1: As a leader’s audience costs capacity
(ACC) increases, other leaders will be less likely to resist a mil-
itary challenge, that is, they will be more likely to back down.
Research Design
If our measure is valid and existing theoretical argu-
ments are sound, then we should observe that as ACC
increases, targets are less likely to reciprocate a milita-
rized challenge. The unit of analysis for our initial
tests is the directed-dispute-dyad-initiation. Following
Schultz (1999), Prins (2003), and Weeks (2008), we
only examine original participants in the dispute. A
militarized interstate dispute (MID) is an event ‘‘in
which the threat, display, or use of military force short
of war by one member state is explicitly directed
toward the government, official representatives, official
forces, property, or territory of another state’’ (Jones,
Bremer, and Singer 1996:168). The dependent vari-
able for this research is MID Reciprocation, which equals
one when the target of a MID responds with a threat,
display, or use of force; zero otherwise.9 The reason
we focus on reciprocation is the difficultly, addressed
earlier, in testing audience costs directly due to the
incentive a leader has to avoid behavior in which he
would suffer such costs. Reciprocation allows us to
examine whether the targeted state believes the credi-
bility of the initiator’s action. As previous works have
argued, a state that generates high levels of audience
costs should be less likely to face reciprocation to its
threat or use of force because of the credibility gener-
ated when a leader faces potential audience costs. A
leader in a state that can generate audience costs is
unlikely to initiate militarized action and then back
down, for doing so calls the leader’s competence into
question and subjects the leader to audience costs
(Schultz 1998; Smith 1998). We use version 3.1 of the
COW MID data for the years 1816–2000 (Ghosn, Pal-
mer, and Bremer 2004) as generated by EUGene
(Bennett and Stam 2000).
Of course, the primary independent variable of
interest is ACC, whose construction we described previ-
ously. In addition, we include the same battery of con-
trol variables as Weeks (2008): Major Power Initiator-
Major Power Target, Minor Power Initiator-Major
Power Target, Major Power Initiator-Minor Power Tar-
get, Initiator’s Relative Power, Contiguity, Allies Dyadic
Alliance Portfolio Similarity, Initiator’s Alliance Portfo-
lio Similarity with the Regional Leader, Target’s Alli-
ance Portfolio Similarity with the Regional Leader,
Territorial Dispute, Regime Dispute, Policy Dispute,
and Other Dispute. For a detailed discussion of the
operationalization of these variables, see the Appen-
dix 1.
Empirical Tests of the Validity of ACC
We begin the assessment of ACC with a set of multivar-
iate logistic models using maximum-likelihood estima-
tion with standard errors clustered on the dispute. In
Model 1 (Table 3), we examine the relationship
between ACC and MID reciprocation for the post–
World War II period. As expected, an increase in ACC
decreases the likelihood of MID reciprocation. Sub-
stantively, a change in ACC from its minimum to its
TABLE 2. Distribution of Audience Cost Capacity Measure and














0 52 70 5
1 25 28 18
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1 24 36 0
2 8 12 0
3 24 36 0
4 2 3 0
5 8 5 13
6 4 1 11














0 16 24 0
1 84 76 100
(Notes. For audience cost capacity (ACC) measure, column totals may not add
to 100% due to rounding. Democracy is defined as a score of six or higher on
the Polity democracy–autocracy index. Weeks’ score equals one if the regime
is democratic, single-party, military, dynastic monarchy, or other autocracy,
zero otherwise. XCONST is the executive constraints measure from Polity IV,
and Prins’ score refers to the measure used in Prins 2003).
9 Specifically, the variable MID reciprocation equals one when the Corre-
lates of War (COW) hostility index score for the target (cwhost2) is greater
than one.
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maximum value decreases the likelihood of MID recip-
rocation by about 40%.10 To ensure that our data are
comparable to those used in existing research, we rep-
licate Weeks (2008) core model specification, and our
findings are nearly identical (Model 2). In Model 3,
we include all of Weeks’ regime type variables as well
as our measure of ACC. The results show that ACC is
still significant and negative, but all of Week’s previ-
ously significant regime variables have lost significance.
ACC appears to be a more robust measure of audience
costs than the regime type approach.
Next, we vary the time period analyzed as a way of
checking for temporal treatment effects. Given the his-
torical uniqueness of the Cold War, this is particularly
important for studies of conflict behavior. In Model 4,
we examine the pre–Cold War era (1816–1945) and in
Model 5, the entire time period 1816–2000. The vari-
able ACC is statistically significant and negative in
both models, suggesting that the validity of ACC as an
indicator of audience costs is not limited to the post-
war era.11
Some examples of specific countries illustrate the util-
ity of ACC. France exhibits significant variation on our
ACC measure since 1816. When it had an ACC score of
zero, targets reciprocated about 46% of the time; when
its ACC score was one, it had a reciprocation rate near
60%, but when its ACC score was two or three, targets
only reciprocated 38% and 39% of the time, respec-
tively. The experience of Spain is even more consistent
with the audience cost theory and our measure. When
Spain’s ACC was zero, targets reciprocated about 64%
of the time, but when its ACC was at least one, it had no
reciprocations, though it initiated 12 disputes. Chile
had an ACC score of zero during the Pinochet years,
and its targets always reciprocated its disputes. However,
in the years during which Chile had an ACC score of
one, only 18 of 31 disputes were reciprocated. Turkey’s
experience is also consistent with the posited effects of
ACC. When Turkey had an ACC score of zero, about
68% of targets reciprocated, but only about 44% recip-
rocated when Turkey had an ACC score greater than
zero.
Notwithstanding the strength of the multivariate
model results and the aforementioned examples, it
would still be nice to know whether the results are dri-
ven primarily by democracies. To this end, we con-
ducted two analyses. First, we deleted all democratic
states from the data, with democracy defined as any
state scoring six or higher on the Polity democracy–
autocracy index. The variable ACC is still significant
and negative. Thus, not only does our measure cap-
ture variation across all regimes, it shows that there is
a significant variation within autocratic regimes. Some
autocracies can generate audience costs, and ACC is a
useful indicator of autocratic ACC. Second, if our mea-
sure is valid, then we should find (i) that high-ACC
democracies and high-ACC autocracies have lower
reciprocation rates than low-ACC democracies and
low-ACC autocracies; (ii) that low-ACC democracies
and low-ACC autocracies have similar reciprocation
rates; and (iii) that high-ACC democracies and high-
ACC autocracies have similar reciprocation rates. To
TABLE 3. Logit Analysis of Effect of Audience Cost Capacity on MID Reciprocation Dependent Variable: Did the Target of a MID Respond with
Threat ⁄ Force? 1 Yes, 0 No












ACC State A )0.245 (0.068)*** )0.356 (0.108)*** )0.165 (0.052)*** )0.181 (0.087)**
Low-ACC Autocracies 0.472 (0.185)***
Low-ACC Democracies 0.668 (0.295)**
High-ACC Autocracies 0.067 (0.473)
Personalist 1.008 (0.220)*** 0.298 (0.298)
Single-Party 0.021 (0.219) )0.825 (0.333)**
Military 0.444 (0.352) )0.194 (0.392)
Hybrid 0.450 (1.067) )0.257 (1.078)
Other Autocracy 0.062 (0.241) )0.353 (0.268)
Dynastic 0.319 (0.591) )0.465 (0.635)
Non-Dynastic 0.633 (0.375)* )0.079 (0.418)
Interregna Autocracy 0.528 (0.199)*** )0.064 (0.264)
Interregna Democracy 0.209 (0.457) 0.065 (0.459)
Controls (not shown)
Constant 0.081 (0.245) )0.683 (0.276)** 0.137 (0.356) )0.186 (0.206) )0.536 (0.435) )0.507 (0.288)
Log likelihood )995.93 )986.30 )979.99 )1606.84 )581.98 )999.05
Observations 1,667 1,667 1,667 2,627 960 1,667
(Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered on dispute, in parentheses. ‘‘Controls’’ are independent variables from Weeks (2008) specification that are used, but not
shown, in all models and are listed in the Appendix 1.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.)
10 We used Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) to calculate the
change in predicted probability. This change is for a dyad involving two con-
tiguous minor powers over a policy issue; all continuous variables are set to
their mean, and binary variables are set at their median value.
11 The results for Model 4 hold if we only examine bilateral disputes and
drop all disputes during the World War years (1914–1918, 1939–1945). In
addition, the ACC measure is negative and significant in additional analyses in
which we examine (i) only disputes between autocracies; (ii) only bilateral dis-
putes; and (iii) only politically relevant dyads. We also examined models with
ACC disaggregated into its two component variables, xropen and parcomp,
and an interaction of these variables. Consistent with the arguments we
advance, neither component variable was significant but the interaction term
was statistically significant and negative (Clark, Gilligan, and Golder 2006).
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identify low- and high-ACC states, we have to choose a
cutpoint on our ACC scale. We chose to identify any
state with an ACC score of two or more as having
high-ACC, thereby making low-ACC states those with
scores of zero or one on our ACC scale. We identify
democracies as any state scoring six or higher on the
Polity democracy–autocracy index.12
For the period 1816–2000, we find the following
reciprocation rates: 48.23% for low-ACC autocracies,
50.26% for low-ACC democracies, 31.58% for high-
ACC autocracies, and 34.49% for high-ACC democra-
cies. Differences in means tests confirm that there is
no statistical difference in reciprocation rates between
low-ACC autocracies and low-ACC democracies, that
there is no difference between high-ACC autocracies
and high-ACC democracies, that low-ACC autocracies
are different from high-ACC autocracies, and that
low-ACC democracies are different from high-ACC
democracies. In addition, we examined multivariate
models in which we replaced ACC with low-ACC
autocracy, low-ACC democracy, and high-ACC autoc-
racy (high-ACC democracy is the base category). For
these multivariate analyses, the expectation is that the
two low-ACC variables will be significant and positive
and that high-ACC autocracy will be insignificant.
This is what we find (see Model 6).
Selection Effects
Although Prins (2003) and Weeks (2008) subject their
measures to extensive sensitivity testing, these tests do
not address concerns about selection effects. Schultz
(1999) noted that states with higher audience costs
might choose targets that are particularly likely to back
down; if this is the case, then omitting the features of
the target states that make them more likely to back
down will negatively bias the coefficient on the audi-
ence cost variable. To mitigate this threat to validity,
Schultz used target fixed effects as a way of capturing
unobserved characteristics of the target states that
might influence their likelihood of backing down.13
However, fixed-effects estimation is potentially prob-
lematic with a binary dependent variable as indepen-
dent variables that have no variation on the
dependent variable lead to observations being
dropped. King (2001) and Beck (2001) note that this
warrants concern.14
To better address selection effects, we analyze a
bivariate probit with sample selection.15 The selection
equation models the initiation of a MID and the out-
come equation models the same process as before,
whether the MID was reciprocated. The first probit
equation, modeling MID initiation, is completely
observed. The second probit equation, modeling
whether the MID is reciprocated, is only partially
observed, because we only observe opportunities for
reciprocation if initiation occurred.16 Using the bivari-
ate probit allows us to confirm the robustness of the
ACC measure even when we take account of potential
selection effects.
Table 4 shows the results of two bivariate probit mod-
els. In each model, we observe that the parameter esti-
mating the correlation of errors between the two
equations, q, is statistically significant, indicating that
the probability of MID reciprocation is related to the
probability of a MID initiation. Even when addressing
the selection process, we find, in both models, that the
variable ACC is significant and negative in the outcome
equation (where the dependent variable is reciproca-
tion). As before, this result holds for multiple time peri-
ods: 1946–2000 (Model 7), 1816–2000 (Model 8), and
1816–1945 (not shown).17
Conclusion
We started this research asking which domestic institu-
tions were central to the generation of audience costs.
A first wave of research on audience costs answers this
question with one word: democracy. That is, demo-
cratic political institutions allow for the generation of
audience costs, while nondemocratic political institu-
tions do not. However, this runs counter to initial dis-
cussions of the concept of audience costs, which noted
that some nondemocratic regimes should be able to
generate audience costs. Democracy, we contend, is
not a satisfactory answer for a second reason. It does
not specify which institutions associated with democ-
racy lead to ACC. Recent research echoes some of
these criticisms (Prins 2003; Weeks 2008). None of the
measures currently used, however, allow for variation
within regimes that can generate audience costs. If
ACC contributes to conflict resolution short of war,
then understanding which institutions facilitate the
realization of these costs, rather than relying on
regime types as proxies for the relevant institution, is
an important task.
12 To shed some light on how ACC varies across autocracies, we note
some of the high-ACC autocracies here (as defined by the criteria above).
These include Russia starting in 1993, France in the late 1950s and early
1960s, Albania in the late 1990s, and Senegal in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Of course, a significant percentage of autocracies receive an ACC score
of 1, as documented in Table 2. It is also worth noting that reciprocation rates
for autocracies with an ACC score of zero are significantly different (and
higher) than for autocracies with an ACC score of one (49% vs. 45%).
13 Schultz concludes that there is some evidence for the existence of a
selection effect, but it is not strong and he was unable to reject the null
hypotheses that the coefficients on the main audience cost variable were
equivalent in the models with and without the target fixed effects (Schultz
1999:258).
14 We did estimate logistic models with target fixed effects, and ACC
remained statistically significant and negative. However, the sign and signifi-
cance of several of Weeks’ regime variables change when we estimate a logistic
model with target fixed effects.
15 This model is sometimes referred to as a censored probit (Lemke and
Reed 2001).
16 Although the model is, technically speaking, identified when the same
explanatory variables appear in both equations (Greene 2008:822), this identi-
fication is based on assumptions about the distribution of the residuals instead
of on variation in the explanatory variables (Sartori 2003:112). Fortunately, we
have theoretical reasons to avoid using the exact same set of independent vari-
ables in both equations. We follow the norm in studies of conflict initiation in
including time since the previous MID (the peace-years variables) as factors
that influence the initiation of MID but not its reciprocation, and we include
the issue variables, which describe the type of conflict of the MID itself, in the
outcome equation.
17 Anderson and Souva (2010) argue that any accountability mechanism,
such as ACC, should be interacted with the balance of power when explaining
the initiation of militarized disputes and that accountability and power posi-
tively interact. Our results confirm their findings. Dropping the interaction
from the first stage does not affect our second-stage findings.
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In this paper, we offer a more precise conceptuali-
zation of ACC than found in the extant literature,
arguing that audience costs are not driven primarily
by executive constraints or factionalism. Rather, we
contend that ACC is a function of political contest-
ability and, drawing on Lake and Baum (2001), note
that contestability is a function of both alternative
rulers and the cost of mobilizing to challenge the lea-
der. As contestability increases, audience costs
increase. Contestability is higher when the path to
the head of state position is open to a larger group
and when the costs of political mobilization are low.
We create a measure of ACC that unites these two
components and test its validity by situating it within
extant models of interstate conflict. This is the first
measure that has variation between more and less
democratic political systems and variation within non-
democratic political systems. Our measure also covers
a larger empirical domain than recent efforts to iden-
tify which autocratic regimes are able to generate
audience costs. We find that our measure of ACC
performs exceptionally well. As a state’s ACC
increases, targets are more likely to back down from
a militarized challenge. We find support for this
hypothesis across multiple model specifications, differ-
ent time periods (including pre–Cold War), and even
after controlling for selection effects. The latter is
especially relevant as previous research has not ade-
quately addressed this concern. Although our mea-
sure of ACC is still an imperfect proxy for the central
institutional mechanisms behind the production of
audience costs, the robust empirical support we find
for it suggests that it is tapping into the primary
aspects of the concept.
Appendix 1
We include the following 13 control variables in our
models in Table 3 in addition to our primary indepen-
dent variable of interest, ACC. These are the same vari-
ables and operationalizations used by Weeks (2008).
Each of these variables was generated using EUGene
(Bennett and Stam 2000) version 3.204. The ‘‘Con-
trols’’ referred to in Table 4 also include a measure of
the log of the distance between countries in a dyad in
both the selection and outcome equations, and cubic
splines in the selection equations.
Major Power Initiator–Major Power Target: This variable
equals one if both the initiator and target of the MID
were major powers, as determined by the COW; other-
wise, it is zero.
Minor Power Initiator–Major Power Target: This variable
equals one if the initiator was not a COW major
power, while the target was a COW defined major
power, zero otherwise.
Major Power Initiator–Minor Power Target: This variable
equals one if the initiator was a COW major power
and the target was not a COW major power, zero
otherwise.
Minor Power Initiator–Minor Power Target is left as the
reference category.
Initiator’s Relative Power equals the COW National
Capabilities score for State A divided by the sum of
the capabilities for States A and B.
Contiguity equals one if the states in the dyad are
contiguous on land or no more than 400 miles apart
across water, zero otherwise.
Ally equals one if the two states share a defense pact,
neutrality pact, or entente, as defined by the COW
project, zero otherwise.
Dyadic Alliance Portfolio Similarity is the weighted glo-
bal S score between the two states in the dyad.
Initiator’s Alliance Portfolio Similarity with the Regional Lea-
der is the S score between the initiator and the regional
leader using countries in the relevant region.
Target’s Alliance Portfolio Similarity with the Regional Lea-
der is the S score between the target and the regional
leader using countries in the relevant region.
TABLE 4. Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection Model of Effect of Audience Cost Capacity on MID Initiation and Reciprocation. Dependent
Variable (Selection equation): Was a MID Initiated? 1 Yes, 0 No. Dependent Variable (Outcome equation): Did the Target of a MID Respond






Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
ACC State A )0.106 (0.025)*** )0.119 (0.038)*** )0.060 (0.019)*** )0.092 (0.027)***
Power Ratio 0.068 (0.058) )0.033 (0.141) )0.03 (0.057) )0.046 (0.108)
ACC State A · Power Ratio 0.059 (0.034)* 0.060 (0.026)**
Peace-Years )0.110 (0.008)*** )0.106 (0.006)***
Territory Issue 0.033 (0.097) 0.209 (0.073)***
Regime Issue )0.061 (0.150) 0.268 (0.135)**
Policy Issue )0.837 (0.097)*** )0.562 (0.075)***
Other Issue )0.759 (0.183)*** )0.446 (0.155)***
Controls (not shown)
Constant )0.571 (0.180)*** 1.109 (0.398)*** )1.493 (0.165)*** 1.550 (0.310)***
Correlation parameter (q) )0.457 (0.085)*** )0.496 (0.64)***
Log likelihood )8776.4 )14260.2
Observations 986,613 1,211,320
(Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered on dyad, in parentheses. ‘‘Controls’’ are independent variables that are used, but not shown, in all models and are listed
in the Appendix 1.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.)
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Territorial Dispute equals one if the primary revision
coding of the dispute is territory, zero otherwise.
Regime Dispute equals one if the primary revision cod-
ing was Regime.
Policy Dispute equals one if the primary revision cod-
ing was Policy. (If no revision type was specified in the
MID, it is coded as Other.)
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